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Echoes from the Past: 
What We Can Learn About Unity, Belonging and 
Respecting Differences from the Flag Salute Cases 
 
Brett G. Scharffs* 
 
Symposium on Belonging, Families, and Family Law 
BYU Law School, January 28, 2011 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
I am honored and daunted by the task of offering some concluding 
comments and reflections. I come not as an expert in family law, but 
as someone who spends most of his time thinking about law and 
religion from an international and comparative perspective, and about 
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, law—like life—does not exist in silos; the 
experiences from one precinct of the law often closely resemble those 
in another, seemingly distant precinct. Experience, hard won, in one 
precinct may illuminate controversies in another. 
As I have reflected on the primary themes of the symposium—
belonging, families and recognition, and the issue of exemptions from 
general and neutral laws—my mind has been drawn to one of the great 
constitutional controversies of the twentieth century: the battle over 
mandatory participation in saluting the flag and reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance. The dispute centered on the conditions for creating and 
sustaining national unity at a time of peril, on the meaning and 
requirements of patriotism, and on the relationship between public 
morale and national security. 
It was also about two very different visions of the American creed 
and of how to inculcate citizenship and belonging, about the respective 
roles of the family and the state in the education of children, and 
 
* Francis R. Kirkham Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School. Associate Director, 
International Center for Law and Religion Studies, Brigham Young University. B.S., B.A., 
M.A., Georgetown University; B.Phil, Oxford University; J.D., Yale Law School. I wish to 
thank Professor Lynn Wardle for the invitation to participate in this symposium, and all the 
participants for their interesting and thoughtful contributions. I wish to thank Galen Fletcher for 
locating so many helpful materials, and Craig Janis for his excellent research assistance. Thanks 
also to the student editors of the B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law, in particular Philip Sheng and 
Wiley Barker, for their editorial help and for publishing the proceedings of this symposium. 
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about how to accommodate conscience and difference. Although this 
controversy was acted out more than seventy years ago, its lessons 
ring remarkably contemporary not only because of recent disputes 
about the constitutionality of the words “under God” in the Pledge,1 
but much more broadly in the dialectic about coercion and conscience 
that are at the very heart of the controversy. 
In the 1940 case Minnersville School District v. Gobitis,2 the 
Supreme Court, focusing on the state’s right to determine appropriate 
means to inculcate patriotism in children, upheld a state statute 
compelling flag salutes in public schools that made no exemption for 
religious objectors. The Court emphasized that this was a general 
secular regulation, and that national unity, which it said underpinned 
national security, was a constitutional value of the highest order.3 
 
 1. For example, in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), a 
father, Newdow, sued his daughter’s school district alleging that the district’s policy of requiring 
students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance each morning was unconstitutional. Id. at 1. 
Specifically, Newdow claimed that the inclusion of the words “under God” in the Pledge 
amounted to a “religious indoctrination of his child” that violated the First Amendment and his 
right as an atheist to instruct his daughter in his views about religion. Id. at 5. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals agreed with Newdow and held that “[t]he school district’s policy . . . places 
students in the untenable position of choosing between participating in an exercise with religious 
content or protesting,” even though the student was not required to participate in reciting the 
Pledge. Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 488 (9th Cir. 2002). The court further 
argued that, “The coercive effect of the policy here is particularly pronounced in the school 
setting given the age and impressionability of schoolchildren, and their understanding that they 
are required to adhere to the norms set by their school, their teacher and their fellow students.” 
Id. Finally, the court noted that, 
The coercive effect of the Pledge is also made even more apparent when we consider 
the legislative history of the Act that introduced the phrase “under God.” These words 
were designed to be recited daily in school classrooms. President Eisenhower, during 
the Act’s signing ceremony, stated: “From this day forward, the millions of our 
school children will daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural 
schoolhouse, the dedication of our Nation and our people to the Almighty.” All in all, 
there can be little doubt that under the controlling Supreme Court cases the school 
district’s policy fails the coercion test. 
Id. (quoting 100 Cong. Rec. 8618 (1954) (statement of Sen. Ferguson incorporating signing 
statement of President Eisenhower)). Ultimately the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on 
the grounds that Newdow did not actually have standing to bring the case because his rights as 
his daughter’s guardian under California law were in dispute. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 17–18. By 
deciding on standing grounds the majority opinion avoided passing judgment on the issue of 
whether the phrase “under God” is a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 18. Despite 
the Court’s avoidance of the issue, the case was widely discussed in the popular press and was a 
major source of controversy in politics. See generally Charles Russo, The Supreme Court and 
Pledge of Allegiance: Does God Still Have a Place in American Schools?, 2004 BYU EDUC. & 
L.J. 301 (2004). One notable result of the controversy was the “Pledge Protection Act of 2005,” 
which was introduced, but not enacted, as an attempt to strip the Federal Courts of jurisdiction 
over legal controversies involving the Pledge. Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
 2. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 3. Id. at 595. 
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Only three years later, the Supreme Court completely reversed course. 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,4 the Court held 
that when state officials compelled participation in the flag salute and 
pledge, they “transcend[ed] constitutional limitations on their power 
and invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose 
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control.”5 In one of the most quotable (and quoted) lines in the history 
of the Supreme Court, Justice Jackson, writing for the Court declared: 
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”6 The story of 
these two great cases, as well as what transpired between them, is one 
of the most remarkable episodes in twentieth-century U.S. 
constitutional history. 
 
II.  GOBITIS 
 
A.  Background 
 
The story begins in the rural, predominantly Catholic, 
Pennsylvania town of Minersville,7 where the Gobitis family joined 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1931.8 In 1935, after one of the church’s 
key national leaders, Judge Joseph F. Rutherford, gave a radio address 
condemning flag salutes as a form of worshipping a graven image,9 
 
 4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 5. Id. at 642. 
 6. Id. 
 7. That Minersville was predominantly Catholic is significant because the Jehovah’s 
Witness doctrine, while harshly critical of all other religions, was especially sharp in its 
condemnation of the Catholic Church. Joseph Rutherford, a Jehovah’s Witness and key player in 
the Gobitis case, was also a strong critic of Catholics. His radio broadcasts, in which he 
disparaged Catholicism, were banned by NBC in the late 1920s for his “rabid attack upon 
organized religion and the clergy.” 1930 INT’L BIBLE STUDENTS ASS’N Y.B. 38 (1929). 
 8. DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR 81–82 (1962) (“Mr. and Mrs. 
Gobitis became Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1931, thus terminating the disrupting effects of a mixed 
Catholic-Protestant marriage. At the time of the original controversy—late 1935—the Gobitis 
family had two children in school—Lillian, born November 2, 1923, and William, born 
September 17, 1925—and three younger children.”). 
 9. It is noteworthy that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ resistance to flag salutes arose from 
opposition to Adolph Hitler, who banned the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany in 1933. 
MANWARING, supra note 8, at 30. As Manwaring describes it, in Germany, “[t]he Witnesses 
responded with open defiance, refusing to give the Nazi salute and vigorously denouncing 
Hitler’s policies. Eventually, some 10,000 Witnesses wound up in concentration camps.” Id. At 
a church convention in 1935, Rutherford gave a speech denouncing Hitler and “the command 
that all persons shall ‘Heil Hitler,’ which in the English language means ‘Salvation is by 
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two of the Gobitis family’s children, Lillian (a seventh grader) and 
William (a fifth grader), stopped saluting the flag in school. 
The children’s teachers’ reactions to their refusal presaged the 
variety of responses that would later play out across the country and 
upon the stage of the Supreme Court. When William refused to salute, 
his teacher “tried to force his arm up, but William held on to his 
pocket and successfully resisted.”10 The next day, Lillian followed 
suit. “Before class, her heart pounding, she went to explain her 
reasoning to her teacher. ‘Miss Schofstahl,’ she said, ‘I can’t salute 
the flag anymore. The Bible says at Exodus chapter 20 that we can’t 
have any other gods before Jehovah God.’ The teacher hugged Lillian 
and said she was a ‘dear girl.’”11 
The controversy got off to an inauspicious start when the 
children’s father, Walter Gobitis, and the superintendant of public 
schools in Minersville, Charles E. Roudabush, locked horns over the 
issue. In the words of David Manwaring, who has written a 
comprehensive history of the flag salute cases, “Roudabush’s outrage 
that anyone should refuse the salute was not mellowed by Gobitis’ 
testy rejoinder that he was a citizen not of the United States but of 
Heaven.”12 Gobitis deemed Roudabush an atheist because Roudabush 
 
Hitler.’” Since salvation can come only by faith in God, Rutherford continued, people of faith 
will “not ‘Heil Hitler’ nor any other creature.” Id. at 30–31. As Manwaring notes, “This line of 
reasoning could apply equally well to the American flag salute.” Id. at 31. Within a few months 
of Rutherford’s speech, the opposition to participating in flag salutes had become a significant 
church doctrine for the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Id. at 32. In a radio address on October 6, 1935, 
Rutherford declared, “Flags of the various nations represent the government and what the 
government stands for. The law of the nation or government that compels the child of God to 
salute the national flag compels that person to salute the Devil as the invisible god of the nation. 
The Christian, therefore, must choose to yield to God’s enemy or to remain true to Almighty 
God.” Id. at 32 (italics omitted). As Noah Feldman explains it, the movement among Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to protest the flag salute 
had emerged almost accidentally. [Judge Rutherford], one of the national leaders of 
the Witnesses, had given a speech earlier in 1935 denouncing the Nazi “Heil Hitler” 
salute: “All people who have faith in God,” he said, should hail “Jehovah and Christ 
Jesus,” not Hitler “or any other creature.” After the speech, several young Witnesses 
around the country applied its logic to the flag salute, which at the time closely 
resembled the straight-arm Nazi salute, except that the palm was to be turned upward, 
not down. Rutherford then gave a radio address praising the students, who were 
standing up for their faith. Lillian and William had heard that speech and had decided 
as a matter of conscience that they would not salute. 
NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES 179–80 (2010). 
 10. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 179. 
 11. Id. 
 12. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 82. As Feldman describes it, “The reaction among the 
Gobitises’ classmates to this presumably unpatriotic act began as astonishment and quickly turned 
to disgust. Lillian was shunned and had to resign as class president. ‘When I got to school each 
morning,’ she later reported, ‘a few boys would shout “Here comes Jehovah!” and shower me 
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believed in evolution, and Roudabush responded by seeking a legal 
opinion that under state law he had the authority to compel the 
students to participate in the patriotic ceremony.13 
After obtaining legal opinions from school officials, at a dramatic 
school board meeting, the school board passed a resolution that 
transformed the flag salute into a legal obligation. Immediately 
thereafter, Superintendant Roudabush stood and expelled the Gobitis 
children from school for insubordination.14 It was this “state action” 
that the Supreme Court would later uphold as “legislation of general 
scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects.”15 
 
B.  Federal District Court and the Court of Appeals 
 
Gobitis filed suit in federal court, and won both at the district 
court and the court of appeals. The district court judge, Albert 
Branson Maris, was a Quaker and a veteran of World War I, who had 
been appointed to the bench by President Franklin Roosevelt.16 Judge 
Maris concluded, “The enforcement of defendants’ regulation 
requiring the flag salute by children who are sincerely opposed to it 
upon conscientious religious grounds is not a reasonable method of 
teaching civics, including loyalty to the State and Federal 
Government, but tends to have the contrary effect upon such 
children.”17 Also crucial was his conclusion regarding the effect of the 
children’s refusal to salute the flag on the state’s interests: 
 
I think it is also clear from the evidence that the refusal of these two 
earnest Christian children to salute the flag cannot even remotely 
prejudice or imperil the safety, health, morals, property, or personal 
rights of their fellows. . . . Our country’s safety surely does not 
depend upon the totalitarian idea of forcing all citizens into one 
common mold of thinking and acting or requiring them to render a 
 
with pebbles.’” FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 180. 
 13. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 82. 
 14. The Minersville School Board unanimously passed the following resolution: “That the 
Superintendent of the Minersville Public Schools be required to demand that all teachers and 
pupils of the said schools be required to salute the flag of our Country as a part of the daily 
exercises. That refusal to salute the flag shall be regarded as an act of insubordination and shall 
be dealt with accordingly.” MANWARING, supra note 8, at 83. After the resolution was adopted, 
Roudabush immediately stood and announced, “I hereby expel from the Minersville schools 
Lillian Gobitis, William Gobitis and Edmund Wasliewski for this act of insubordination, to wit, 
failure to salute the flag in our school exercises.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 15. Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940). 
 16. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 91. 
 17. Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271, 273 (E.D. Penn. 1938), quoted in 
MANWARING, supra note 8, at 104. 
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lip service of loyalty in a manner which conflicts with their sincere 
religious convictions.18 
 
The three judge panel at the court of appeals, comprised of 
William Clark,19 John Biggs, Jr.,20 and Harry E. Kalodner,21 affirmed 
the decision below.22 Judge Clark’s opinion cited the letter from 
George Washington to a group of Quakers, assuring them that in light 
of their conscientious objection to serving in the military, he favored 
treating “the conscientious scruples of all men . . . with great delicacy 
and tenderness.”23 The Minersville school district, Judge Clark 
scolded, “has failed to ‘treat the conscientious scruples’ of all children 
with that ‘great delicacy and tenderness.’ We agree with the father of 
our country that they should and we concur with the learned District 
Court in saying that they must.”24 
 
C.  Arguments before the Supreme Court 
 
School officials appealed the case to the Supreme Court. 
However, by the time the case reached the Court in late 1939, the 
political context had begun to change. The Jehovah’s Witnesses were 
pacifists, who had opposed the United States’ participation in World 
War I and now opposed involvement in World War II.25 Germany had 
invaded Poland in September 1939, but the United States would not 
 
 18. Id. at 274. 
 19. William Clark was a native of Newark, New Jersey, the recipient of three Harvard 
degrees, and a veteran of World War I. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 111. He was appointed to 
the Circuit Court of Appeals by President Roosevelt in 1938, but he had first drawn national 
attention in 1930 when he unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the Eighteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 111–12. 
 20. John Biggs, Jr., also a Harvard graduate, was appointed to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals by President Roosevelt in 1938. Id. at 112. He was a member of the American Legion, 
which is particularly notable owing to the intensity with which members of the American Legion 
would persecute the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the aftermath of the Gobitis decision. Id. at 112. 
 21. Harry E. Kalodner, a Philadelphia native and Pennsylvania graduate, was also a 
member of the American Legion. Id. at 112. Kalodner was not a sitting judge on the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, but he was called in to replace Judge Maris who had been elevated to the 
Circuit Court of Appeals after deciding the Gobitis case in the District Court and could not hear 
the appeal of his own decision. Id. 
 22. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939). 
 23. Id. at 693 (quoting Writings of George Washington (Sparks Ed. Vol. 12, pp. 168–69), 
Letter to the Religious Society Called Quakers, October, 1789)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 24. Gobitis, 108 F.2d at 693. 
 25. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 180 (“The Witnesses’ motivation was religious. When 
they described the flag salute as idolatry, the Witnesses were criticizing patriotic nationalism. 
For them, placing the state and its symbols on a par with God was an act of blasphemy.”). 
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formally enter the war for another two years, until after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor.26 Nationalism and isolationism were powerful 
forces in U.S. politics and culture.27 There were great fears of divisive 
foreign influences.28 
Against this political backdrop, the school district found a 
sympathetic audience for its argument that the flag salute requirement 
was a generally applicable “secular regulation” designed to uphold 
public morale. The state argued, “Any breakdown in the esprit de 
corps or morale of this country may conceivably have a more 
devastating effect upon the nation than a catastrophe resulting from 
disease, breach of the peace, or even an invasion of the realm.”29 
Requiring participation in the flag salute, the school district argued, 
was reasonable, akin to other mandatory elements of the school 
program.30 
Meanwhile, Olin R. Moyle, the Gobitises’ attorney and the 
church’s legal counsel, who had successfully pursued the case through 
the court of appeals, had a falling out with Judge Rutherford, was 
fired from the case, and was expelled from the movement. Rutherford 
himself then wrote and filed the brief and argued before the Supreme 
Court on behalf of the Gobitises. 
Rutherford devoted most of his brief to an entirely new argument, 
that the Minersville regulation violated the religious freedom guarantee 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It is hard to imagine that this new 
strategy, or the tone of his argument, was helpful to his clients’ cause. 
As Rutherford put it, 
 
The vital question in the instant case is this: Shall the creature man 
 
 26. For a general history of World War II, see C. L. SULZBERGER & STEPHEN E. 
AMBROSE, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE NEW HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II (1997). 
 27. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 180–81 (“To its proponents, the flag salute meant 
something different with a world war brewing and a draft in the offing than it might have done 
otherwise. A child’s salute has special significance when there is the prospect that the nation may 
go to war behind the flag. By the time Judge Rutherford argued the children’s case himself 
before the Supreme Court in late April 1940, comparing the children to Daniel in the lion’s den, 
the case had turned into controversy about wartime loyalty. France was poised to fall to Nazi 
Germany—and would fall just days after the opinion was handed down in June.”). 
 28. Before World War II a “fifth column hysteria [began] to sweep the country.” 
MANWARING, supra note 8, at 153. 
 29. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 119. 
 30. Id. at 120 (“The youth of today will be the adult citizens of tomorrow and the public 
schools should be permitted through patriotic exercises to inculcate in them a love of country.”); 
id. (Roudabush was cited for his “expert” opinion that dire results would follow if an exemption 
were permitted. “Such demonstration of disrespect to our government will influence and affect 
other pupils in the schools, and the morale of their respective communities, and ultimately that of 
the nation itself, will be shaken and demoralized.”). 
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be free to exercise his conscientious belief in God and his obedience 
to the law of Almighty God, the Creator, or shall the creature man 
be compelled to obey the law or rule of the State, which law of the 
State, as the creature conscientiously believes, is in direct conflict 
with the law of Almighty God?31 
 
In sum, Rutherford said, the issue may be stated as “[t]he arbitrary 
totalitarian rule of the State versus full devotion and obedience to the 
THEOCRATIC GOVERNMENT or Kingdom of Jehovah God under 
Christ Jesus His anointed King.”32 
Manwaring explains that in his brief Rutherford “tried to link the 
Minersville regulation to the bogey of totalitarianism, noting the 
ceremony’s physical similarity to the Nazi salute and relating the 
Witnesses’ troubles in Germany.”33 Manwaring’s verdict is that this 
was “a discouragingly bad brief.”34 Not only did it ignore the most 
critical constitutional issues, it “seemed calculated to produce a 
negative emotional effect with its repeated recourse to argument ad 
hominem.”35 
 
D.  The Supreme Court’s Holding 
 
1.  Frankfurter’s majority opinion 
 
By an 8–1 margin the Supreme Court decided against the 
Witnesses and for the school district.36 After lobbying Chief Justice 
Hughes for the assignment, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the 
majority opinion for the Court.37 He focused on two principal 
 
 31. Id. at 122. 
 32. Id. (capitalization in original). 
 33. According to Manwaring, the modern flag salute ceremony started in 1892 as a mass 
patriotic demonstration in recognition of Columbus’ discovery of the Americas. MANWARING, 
supra note 8, at 2. Congress then declared the day a holiday and authorized the first pledge, 
which was, “I pledge allegiance to my flag and the Republic for which it stands, one nation 
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” Id. Manwaring notes that, “At the words ‘to my 
flag,’ the right hand was extended, palm up and slightly raised, toward the flag.” Id. In 1923 
and 1924 the pledge was amended to be, “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of 
America and the Republic for which it stands; one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for 
all.” Id. at 2–3. In 1942, to avoid the similarity of the salute to the Nazi “Heil Hitler,” Congress 
changed the salute to be the right hand over the heart. Id. 
 34. Id. at 123. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Frankfurter’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Roberts, Black, Reed, Douglas, 
Murphy, and Chief Justice Hughes. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
Justice McReynolds concurred in the result. Justice Harlan F. Stone was the lone dissenter. Id. 
at 601. 
 37. According to Feldman, Frankfurter “had multiple reasons to be engaged with the 
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arguments: free exercise and due process. Citing the “secular 
regulation” rule, Frankfurter wrote: 
 
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle 
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a 
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious 
beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which 
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve 
the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities. The 
necessity for this adjustment has again and again been recognized.38 
 
In response to the due process argument, Frankfurter brought out 
the heavy artillery, quoting Abraham Lincoln’s famous question, 
“Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its 
people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”39 Having thus 
raised the stakes to the very existence of the government, Frankfurter 
opined, 
 
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of 
cohesive sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those 
agencies of the mind and spirit which may serve to gather up the 
traditions of a people. . . . The flag is the symbol of our national 
unity, transcending all internal differences.40 
 
As Manwaring notes, “never has the case for ‘flag worship’ been 
more appealingly put.”41 Frankfurter bolstered this argument about the 
symbolic significance of the flag to national unity with an appeal to 
judicial restraint and respect for the political judgments of those who 
enacted the Minersville regulation. As Feldman explains, “Frankfurter 
was proud of his opinion. He believed he had shown how liberal 
constitutional theory worked in practice. It respected civil liberties 
without interfering in legislative judgments. And it was able to 
recognize important political values, like the need to promote national 
unity.”42 Deferring to the political judgment of the Pennsylvania 
school officials was an exercise of judicial restraint, one of the 
 
undertaking. As Frankfurter framed the issues, the case was an opportunity to expound the 
constitutional theory [of judicial restraint] he had developed. Just as important, Frankfurter was a 
careful student of international affairs and a Europe watcher who had identified Hitler’s threat 
early, and so was staunchly pro-war.” FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 181. 
 38. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594–95. 
 39. Id. at 596. 
 40. Id. 
 41. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 139. 
 42. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 182. 
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lodestars in Frankfurter’s constitutional galaxy.43 
Perhaps most significantly, Frankfurter cited the importance of the 
values weighing against the Gobitises’ free exercise and due process 
rights. “We are dealing with an interest inferior to none in the 
hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the basis of national 
security.”44 
Justices Black, Reed, Douglas, and Murphy (the other Roosevelt 
appointees to the Supreme Court), and Justices Roberts and Hughes 
(Hoover appointees), wholeheartedly joined Frankfurter’s opinion. 
Justice Douglas, for example, demonstrated the high level of 
enthusiasm amongst the members of the majority when he called the 
draft “historic” and “truly statesmanlike.”45 
 
2.  Justice Stone’s dissent 
 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, a holdover appointee from Calvin 
Coolidge, stood alone in dissent. His dissent focused on freedom of 
thought, spirit, expression, and most importantly, religious freedom. 
In his words, 
 
The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties of freedom of the 
human mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportunity to 
express them. They presuppose the right of the individual to hold 
such opinions as he will and to give them reasonably free 
expression, and his freedom, and that of the state as well, to teach 
and persuade others by the communication of ideas. The very 
essence of liberty which they guaranty is the freedom of the 
individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he 
shall say, at least where the compulsion is to bear false witness to 
his religion. If these guaranties are to have any meaning they must, I 
 
 43. Indeed, Frankfurter, who had been a member of the national committee of the 
American Civil Liberties Union before joining the court, desired to have it both ways. Id. at 
181. Frankfurter viewed himself as a civil libertarian, and the ACLU had filed a brief in the case 
on behalf of the Gobitises. Id. Frankfurter said that in his view the best way to promote national 
unity was not by forcing everyone to salute the flag—rather he favored tolerating such 
“crotchety” beliefs. Id. “But, Frankfurter went on to explain, the job of the Court was not to 
decide whether the school board had followed the best course of action. It was, instead, to 
ascertain whether the school board had made a reasonable choice in requiring the children to 
salute.” Id. at 181–82. 
 44. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595. As Feldman explains, in 
Frankfurter’s view patriotism “was the glue that held the nation together: ‘The flag is a symbol 
of our national unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the framework 
of the Constitution.’” FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 181. To put an exclamation point on this view, 
Frankfurter quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes: “We live by symbols.” Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596, 
quoted in FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 181 n.9. 
 45. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 182. 
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think, be deemed to withhold from the state any authority to compel 
belief or the expression of it where that expression violates religious 
convictions, whatever may be the legislative view of the desirability 
of such compulsion.46 
 
Justice Stone’s dissent has been widely recognized as a stirring 
defense of the individual’s liberty of conscience against compelling 
expression of beliefs that violate one’s religious convictions.47 By the 
time Gobitis was reversed by Barnette in 1943, Justice Stone had 
replaced Hughes as Chief Justice, and he assigned the task of writing 
the Barnette opinion to a new member of the court, Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, who had been appointed in 1941. 
 
III.  THE INTERIM 
 
In some ways, Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Gobitis was the 
high-water mark of his intellectual leadership of the group of justices 
appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt.48 Although Frankfurter was very 
proud of the decision, and would cling to its reasoning even when the 
majority of his brethren on the Court abandoned it, the political and 
legal fallout turned out to be devastating. 
 
A.  The Anti-Jehovah’s Witness Backlash 
 
What Frankfurter had not foreseen was the social, political, and 
legal reaction to the decision. As Manwaring recounts, and numerous 
other commentators have affirmed, “[t]he wave of anti-Witness 
persecution which swept the country after the Gobitis decision is 
legendary.”49 Although this was probably only partially due to the 
decision itself, it was undoubtedly an important contributing factor, 
and indeed a trigger. 
Hundreds of instances of vigilantism against Jehovah’s Witnesses 
who refused to salute the flag were reported in just the week following 
 
 46. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 47. While Stone’s defense of conscience in his Gobitis dissent is quite stirring, it is 
interesting to note that five years later, while serving as Chief Justice, Stone died from a cerebral 
hemorrhage suffered while reading a dissenting opinion from the bench in a case where he would 
have disallowed naturalization of a Seventh-day Adventist conscientious objector who refused to 
make a declaration that she would be willing to fight for the defense of the country. See 
Girourard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–79 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
 48. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 185 (“It seemed right that Frankfurter should assume 
intellectual leadership on the newly formed Roosevelt Court. Yet this would turn out to be the 
momentary high point of Frankfurter’s judicial influence among the Roosevelt appointees.”). 
 49. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 163. 
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the decision.50 These included mob beatings, burning of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses Kingdom Halls, and attacks on houses where Jehovah’s 
Witnesses were believed to live. As Noah Feldman has described the 
reaction, “To some horrified observers, it appeared that the Supreme 
Court, by denying the children the constitutional right to be exempt 
from saluting, had declared open season on the Witnesses.”51 One of 
the most notorious episodes took place in York County, Maine: 
 
Two Witnesses were beaten in Sanford on June 8, when they refused 
to salute. The following day, in Kennebunk, a carload of men 
conveniently equipped with throwing-size rocks “just happened to 
stop” in front of the Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Hall which doubled 
as the home of the company servant. The Witnesses, already jittery 
from a fortnight of tension, greeted the visitors with shotgun fire, 
seriously wounding one. Six Witnesses were arrested for attempted 
murder. In the meantime, an enraged mob of 2,500, failing to reach 
the prisoners, sacked and burned the Kingdom Hall, then drifted 
over to Biddeford to attack houses suspected of containing 
Witnesses. . . . The well-publicized outburst in Maine may well 
have had as much to do with triggering persecution elsewhere as the 
Gobitis decision itself.52 
 
Many local and state governments adopted flag-salute statutes, and 
as a result, scores of Witness students were expelled from school.53 
One of the most common occurrences of vigilantism was the arbitrary 
imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witnesses.54 Sometimes this imprisonment 
was for the purpose of protecting the Jehovah’s Witnesses from mobs, 
but more often it involved authorities who were complicit in the 
persecutions of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the aftermath of Gobitis.55 
 
 50. Manwaring recounts these in detail. Among other incidents, the whole adult 
population of Litchfield, Illinois, gathered to attack 60 Jehovah’s Witnesses; in Rawlings, 
Wyoming, a crowd led by the American Legion descended upon a trailer camp set up by 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in preparation for a regional meeting and forced them across the state line; 
in Nebraska a Witness was lured from his house, abducted, and castrated; in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, armed workers from a federal pipeline project beat Witnesses, shooting two; in 
Klammath Falls, Oregon, a mob of a thousand townspeople stormed a Kingdom Hall. 
MANWARING, supra note 8, at 163–86. Feldman recounts, “Between June 12 and 20, 1940, the 
FBI received reports of hundreds of cases of anti-Witness violence, including attacks on Bible 
meetings.” FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 185. 
 51. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 185. 
 52. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 164–65. 
 53. Id. at 185. 
 54. Id. at 166 (“It became fashionable in many places to jail Witnesses on sight, ‘just in 
case.’”). 
 55. Id. (“The most disturbing aspect of the mounting persecution was the frequent 
involvement of local public officials.”). 
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The political context also underwent a seismic shift between 1940 
and 1943. By 1943 the U.S. was at war with Nazi Germany—“a 
country whose policies were aimed precisely at suppressing a religious 
minority.”56 As Feldman explains, “To liberals, tolerance, not 
saluting, had become the American form of patriotism.”57 
 
B.  The Supreme Court 
 
Between Gobitis and Barnette, the Supreme Court heard numerous 
cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses. Most had to do with various tax 
schemes that were imposed upon door-to-door solicitors, including 
those like the Witnesses who were distributing religious materials. 
One of these cases, Jones v. Opelika,58 is noteworthy because three of 
the justices—Black, Douglas, and Murphy—who had joined 
Frankfurter’s majority in Gobitis took the unusual step of calling for 
the case to be revisited.59 The dissent had nothing to do with the facts 
of Opelika, and essentially amounted to an apology for their votes in 
Gobitis.60 
Also significant was the replacement of Justice James F. Byrnes, a 
prominent New Dealer who left the Court after just one term to head 
President Roosevelt’s Office of War Mobilization, by Wiley Rutledge, 
who had decided a license tax dispute in favor of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses while on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.61 Justice 
 
 56. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 228. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623–24 (1942) (Black, Douglas, and 
Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy wrote, 
The opinion of the Court sanctions a device which in our opinion suppresses or tends 
to suppress the free exercise of a religion practiced by a minority group. This is but 
another step in the direction which Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis . . . took 
against the same religious minority and is a logical extension of the principles upon 
which that decision rested. Since we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis Case, we 
think this is an appropriate occasion to state that we now believe that it was also 
wrongly decided. 
Id. Feldman recounts how stung Douglas, Black, and Murphy felt in response to the widespread 
liberal condemnation of the majority position in Gobitis. “[T]he liberal outcry over the case 
could have only one interpretation: The Court had gotten the Gobitis case wrong. Condemnation 
in the liberal media meant that they had misunderstood not only the will of the people but the 
true meaning of liberalism. Frankfurter had led them astray. Stone’s dissent was right. The 
Coolidge appointee had out-liberaled them.” FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 186. 
 61. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 202. Dissenting in a three-judge panel decision, 
Rutledge wrote, 
This is no time to wear away further the freedoms of conscience and mind by nicely 
technical or doubtful construction. Everywhere they are fighting for life. . . . They 
can be lost in time also by steady legal erosion wearing down broad principle into thin 
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Robert H. Jackson, who would author the Court’s opinion in Barnette, 
was another important new addition to the Court.62 
In Opelika, the Court had divided closely at 5–4,63 and the 
Supreme Court granted a petition for rehearing in Opelika on 
February 15, 1943, the day Justice Rutledge was sworn in as a justice 
of the Court.64 On May 3, 1943, the Supreme Court reversed its 
holding in Opelika, and in the companion case, Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, struck down a licensing scheme as a violation of Free 
Exercise rights.65 Murdock was argued on March 11, 1943, the same 
day that the court heard argument in West Virginia v. Barnette.66 In 
Barnette, the court dominated by Roosevelt’s appointees reversed itself 
for the first time, a brief three years after its resounding 8–1 
affirmation of compelling participation in the flag salute in Gobitis. 
 
IV.  BARNETTE 
 
A.  Background 
 
West Virginia was one of the states that stiffened its laws 
compelling participation in patriotic observances in the wake of 
Gobitis. State law required all students to attend public schools, and in 
January 1942, pursuant to this law, the State School Board passed a 
resolution requiring students to participate in saluting the flag.67 The 
resolution quoted Frankfurter’s Gobitis opinion at length, emphasizing 
the importance of obedience to general laws that promote national 
unity and national security. For example, the resolution provided in 
 
right. Jehovah’s Witnesses have had to choose between their consciences and public 
education for their children. In my judgment, they should not have to give up also the 
right to disseminate their religious views in an orderly manner on the public streets, 
exercise it at the whim of public officials, or be taxed for doing so without their 
license. I think the judgment should be reversed. 
Id. (quoting Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). 
 62. Justice Robert H. Jackson had a varied and interesting career, but he was most proud 
of his work as the U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials. For his first-person account of what 
transpired at Nuremberg, see Robert H. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect: Legal Answer to 
International Lawlessness, 35 A.B.A. J. 813 (1949). 
 63. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 198. 
 64. Id. at 203. 
 65. Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 
105 (1943). 
 66. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 207. 
 67. This was done pursuant to a West Virginia law that required all public and private 
schools to provide instruction in U.S. history and civics “for the purpose of teaching, fostering 
and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism. . . .” W.VA. CODE § 1734 
(1943), quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 208. 
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part, 
 
WHEREAS, the West Virginia State Board of Education recognizes 
that . . . conscientious scruples have not in the course of the long 
struggle for religious toleration relieved the individual from 
obedience to the general law not aimed at the promotion or 
restriction of religious beliefs . . . that national unity is the basis of 
national security . . . that the public schools . . . are dealing with 
the formative period in the development of citizenship . . . .68 
 
The Board resolved, 
 
That the West Virginia State Board of Education does hereby 
recognize and order that the commonly accepted salute to the Flag of 
the United States . . . now becomes a regular part of the program of 
activities in the public schools . . . and that all teachers . . . and 
pupils in such schools shall be required to participate . . . provided, 
however, that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an act of 
insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly.69 
 
This provision was aimed directly at Jehovah’s Witness children, 
who were quite numerous in West Virginia.70 Witness children were 
expelled from school throughout the state.71 Some state judges tried to 
mitigate the effect of the expulsions, citing religious freedom grounds 
that the expulsion violated the West Virginia Constitution’s religious 
freedom guarantee.72 
In the wake of the dissents in Jones v. Opelika, the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ new chief legal strategist, Hayden Covington, knew it was 
time to bring another case testing the constitutionality of the flag 
salute. For strategic reasons, West Virginia was an attractive forum 
because a case to enjoin a statewide regulation requiring the flag salute 
could be brought before a three-judge District Court panel, which 
 
 68. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943), quoted in 
MANWARING, supra note 8, at 209. 
 69. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 209. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Brief of Plaintiffs at 6, 75, Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 
(S.D. W. Va. 1942) (No. 242), cited in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 209. 
 72. Manwaring notes that, “In spite of the stringent governing statutes, such actions seem 
to have been neither numerous nor particularly successful. . . . One factor operating was the 
hostility of many trial judges.” MANWARING, supra note 8, at 209. As evidence of this, 
Manwaring highlights cases in Hancock and Upshar counties in which the judges acknowledged 
the legality of the expulsions, but maintained that any further punishment of the non-saluting 
children or their parents would violate West Virginia’s constitutional protections of religious 
freedom. Id. at 209. 
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could then be appealed directly and expeditiously to the Supreme 
Court.73 
 
B.  The Lower Court Decision 
 
The Barnette case was initially heard by a three-judge tribunal 
made up of Federal District Court Judge Ben Moore, District Judge 
Harry E. Watkins, and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John J. 
Parker. At a preliminary hearing, the lawyer for the state school 
board, Ira Partlow, admitted that he disapproved of the school board’s 
policy, but believed it was legal.74 At the initial hearing, Judge Parker 
was openly critical of the school board’s policy and urged the board to 
reach a compromise with the Jehovah’s Witnesses, but the next day 
the School Board voted against compromise.75 
After another hearing, the three-judge panel decided in favor of 
Barnette and against the school officials, and issued a permanent 
injunction prohibiting the school board “from requiring the children of 
the plaintiffs, or any other children having religious scruples against 
such action, to salute the flag of the United States, or any other flag, 
or from expelling such children from school for failure to salute it.”76 
Reaching back to the rationale in the lower court opinions in the 
Gobitis case, Judge Parker, writing for a unanimous panel, stated the 
issue and legal standard as follows: 
 
To justify the overriding of religious scruples . . . there must be a 
clear justification therefor in the necessities of national or community 
life. Like the right of free speech, it is not to be overborne by the 
police power, unless its exercise presents a clear and present danger 
to the community. . . . 
 
 Can it be said . . . that the requirement that school children salute 
the flag has such direct relation to the safety of the state, that the 
conscientious objections of plaintiffs must give way. . . ?77 
 
So stated, the answer to the question was easy—“to ask these 
 
 73. Id. at 211. 
 74. Id. at 212. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (quoting Injunction) (on file in the Federal Court Building, Charleston, West 
Virginia). 
 77. Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 254 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), 
quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 213. 
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questions is to answer them, and to answer them in the negative.”78 
According to the panel, “The salute to the flag is an expression of the 
homage of the soul. To force it upon one who has conscientious 
scruples against giving it, is petty tyranny unworthy of the spirit of 
this Republic and forbidden, we think, by the fundamental law.”79 
 
C.  Arguments Before the Supreme Court 
 
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, West Virginia, on behalf of 
the State Board of Education, emphasized the Gobitis decision. The 
State appealed to the value of stare decisis, arguing that the Court 
must be consistent with its earlier precedents in order to garner 
institutional respect and in order to give people a basis for planning 
their affairs on an orderly manner.80 At oral argument, the state’s 
lawyer emphasized that the flag salute regulation was a general, non-
discriminatory, educational measure, precisely like the one upheld in 
Gobitis.81 
The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ brief focused on three primary claims: 
first, that compelled flag salutes were a violation of the children’s 
Free Exercise rights, second, that the regulation violated the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and third, that the 
Gobitis decision had pernicious effects and should be overturned.82 
These arguments were a marked improvement upon those made by 
Rutherford in the Gobitis case. 
 
D.  The Supreme Court 
 
On Flag Day, June 14, 1943, the Supreme Court issued a 6–3 
decision in favor of the Barnette children, expressly overruling 
Gobitis.83 The majority opinion was written by Justice Jackson, who 
had taken his seat on the court after Gobitis had been decided. He was 
joined by Justices Stone, Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. 
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy, who had written the dissent in 
Opelika regretting their position in Gobitis, concurred separately in 
 
 78. Id., quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 213. 
 79. Id., quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 213. 
 80. Brief for Appellants, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(No. 591), cited in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 216. 
 81. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 212. 
 82. Brief of Appellee, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 
591), cited in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 217. 
 83. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640. 
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two additional opinions. Justices Reed and Roberts dissented, stating 
simply that in their opinion Gobitis remained good law, as did Justice 
Frankfurter, who wrote a long, vigorous dissenting opinion that Reed 
and Roberts declined to join.84 
 
1.  Justice Jackson’s majority opinion 
 
Justice Jackson’s opinion contained a point-by-point rebuttal to the 
arguments made three years earlier in Justice Frankfurter’s majority 
opinion in Gobitis.85 Most importantly, in response to Frankfurter’s 
arguments in favor of judicial restraint, Jackson advanced a strong 
formulation of “preferred freedoms,” including the freedom of speech, 
the press, and religion, which were to be weighed differently than 
restrictions on economic interests.86 These freedoms, Jackson wrote, 
“are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate 
danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.”87 According 
to Jackson, the “very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them 
as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”88 Language like this 
would become commonplace in Supreme Court opinions over the next 
 
 84. Id. at 646–71. 
 85. Id. at 636–42. Justice Jackson first addressed Frankfurter’s characterization of the 
issue as being either a government that is too strong to support liberty or too weak to exist, and 
countered that “[g]overnment of limited power need not be anemic government” because 
“observance of the limitations of the Constitution will not weaken the government in the field 
appropriate for its exercise.” Id. at 636–37. Jackson then rejected the argument that the Supreme 
Court ought not interfere with the authority of the school boards, noting that “[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of 
Education not excepted.” Id. at 637. Next Jackson dismissed the argument that this was an issue 
better left to the political processes. He argued, “The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts. One’s right to . . . freedom of worship . . . may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] 
on the outcome of no elections.” Id. at 638 (italics in original). Finally, Jackson attacked the 
national unity argument and noted that, “[n]ational unity as an end which officials may foster by 
persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is whether under our Constitution 
compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement.” Id. at 640. Jackson 
argued that it was not constitutionally permissible, and coined his famous observation that “[i]f 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which 
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.” Id. at 640–62. 
 86. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639, cited in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 226. 
 87. Id., quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 226. 
 88. Id. at 638. Jackson continued, “fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Id. at 638. 
361] FLAG SALUTE CASES 379 
 
forty years, but in 1943 this was a relatively new and resounding 
articulation of the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. 
Jackson then responded to Frankfurter’s central argument that 
national unity is needed to preserve national security: 
 
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife 
becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no 
deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation 
than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose 
program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in 
embracing. . . . Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent 
soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.”89 
 
This is a deft inversion of Frankfurter’s concern about national unity 
and security. These values are not viewed as a grave and present 
danger that would justify compelling everyone to salute the flag; 
rather, compelling unity itself is what would constitute a grave 
national catastrophe. 
In Jackson’s view, coercing uniformity is no way to generate 
unity, because forcing people into a showdown between conscience 
and following the law creates a scenario with no winners. 
Furthermore, when doctrines are imposed on everyone, the battle over 
which doctrine to impose becomes embracing. The final logic of such 
a contest is the extermination of dissenters by those who insist upon 
eliminating dissent. 
For Jackson, one of the fundamental lessons of our constitutional 
democracy is that the government, whether national, state, or local, 
must stay out of the business of coercing orthodoxy in matters of 
opinion. In his formulation, this involved protecting free speech for 
everyone, not just religious dissenters: 
 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any 
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to 
us. 
 
 We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag 
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power 
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose 
 
 89. Id. at 641, quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 228. 
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of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all 
official control.90 
 
According to Jackson’s formulation, compelling the flag salute 
violates the most basic protection of conscience—the sphere of mind 
and heart—afforded by the First Amendment. In contrast to what 
might be called Frankfurter’s orthodox secularism, in which the right 
way is right for everyone, Jackson offers up a vision of pluralism 
bounded by a framework of secularity.91 
In their concurring opinions, Black, Douglas, and Murphy strive 
to set out what the appropriate test should be for measuring claims of 
religious conscience. Black and Douglas propose a test that would 
require obedience when “either imperatively necessary to protect 
society as a whole from grave and pressingly imminent dangers,” or 
in the event that the regulations “merely regulate time, place or 
manner of religious activity.”92 
Justice Murphy begins his concurring opinion with a strong 
endorsement of the principle of religious freedom. “Reflection has 
convinced me that as a judge, I have no loftier duty or responsibility 
than to uphold that spiritual freedom to its farthest reaches.”93 He 
proposed approving limits only “insofar as essential operations of 
government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society,” 
such as the requirement that someone give evidence in court.94 
 
 90. Id. at 642, quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 229. 
 91. I contrast at length the difference between secularism and secularity in Brett G. 
Scharffs, Four Views of the Citadel: The Consequential Distinction between Secularity and 
Secularism, RELIGION & HUM. RTS. (forthcoming) (internal citations omitted): 
Both secularity and secularism are linked to the general historical process of 
secularization, but as I use the terms, they have significantly different meanings and 
practical implications. By “secularity” I mean an approach to religion-state relations 
that avoids identification of the state with any particular religion or ideology 
(including secularism itself) and that endeavors to provide a neutral framework 
capable of accommodating a broad range of religions and beliefs. By “secularism”, in 
contrast, I mean an ideological position that is committed to promoting a secular 
order. Secularity is a more modest concept, committed to creating what might be 
called a broad realm of “constitutional space” in which competing conceptions of the 
good (some religious, some not) may be worked out in theory and lived in practice by 
their proponents, adherents, and critics. Secularism, in contrast, is itself a positive 
ideology that the state may be committed to promoting, an ideology that may manifest 
itself as opposition to religiously-based or religiously-motivated reasons by political 
actors, hostility to religion in public life and an insistence that religious 
manifestations, reasons, or even beliefs be relegated to an ever-shrinking sphere of 
private life, or even an aggressive proselytizing atheism, or what has been called 
“secular fundamentalism.” 
 92. Id. at 643–44, quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 229. 
 93. Id. at 645. 
 94. Id. at 645–46, quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 230. Justice Murphy 
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2.  Justice Frankfurter’s dissent 
 
According to Manwaring,  
 
Justice Frankfurter’s lone dissenting opinion in Barnette is best 
described as a prolonged and very personal cry of outrage. Not only 
had the majority decided wrongly and maligned a Frankfurter 
opinion; they had violated the proprieties of judging itself. 
Frankfurter lectured his brethren—the tone of the opinion precludes 
any other description—on the law and their duty as judges in a 
manner reminiscent of his classroom days at Harvard.95 
 
Noah Feldman concurs: “Frankfurter took the reversal of his 
Gobitis opinion as a professional and personal calamity.”96 
Frankfurter’s dissent is, in Feldman’s words, “the most agonized and 
agonizing opinion recorded anywhere in the U.S. reports.”97 In one 
sentence Frankfurter begins with an extremely personal reflection 
upon his Jewish identity, quickly summarizes his view about judicial 
restraint and the proper limited role of judges, and ends with a 
defensive invocation of his bona fides as a civil libertarian: 
 
 One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in 
history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by 
our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should 
wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in 
the Court’s opinion, representing as they do the thought and action 
of a lifetime.98 
 
Justice Frankfurter saw the case turning on the role of the 
judiciary in the legislative process. In this case, as in Gobitis, he 
argued, reasonable men could differ as to the necessity of a 
compulsory flag salute as a way of promoting good citizenship, but it 
is not the role of the judiciary to deem a law unconstitutional when the 
legislature could have had a reasonable basis for passing it. For 
Frankfurter, his Barnette dissent, like his Gobitis majority opinion 
 
concludes, “I am unable to agree that the benefits that may accrue to society from the 
compulsory flag salute are sufficiently definite and tangible to justify the invasion of freedom and 
privacy that is entailed . . . .” Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646. 
 95. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 230. 
 96. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 229 “It was bad enough that the Court had rejected the 
philosophy of judicial restraint on which he had built his reputation. But it was much worse that 
the Court was using the flag salute as a metaphor for the Nazis’ oppression of Jews.” Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646–47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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before it, became an opportunity to propound his philosophy of 
judicial restraint.99 
He specifically rejected the “preferred freedoms” doctrine: “The 
Constitution does not give us greater veto power when dealing with 
one phase of ‘liberty’ than with another.”100 Frankfurter also embraced 
a new formulation of the “secular regulation” rule, which held that 
laws that burden religious exercise are constitutional. According to 
Frankfurter, 
 
 The essence of the religious freedom guaranteed by our 
Constitution is therefore this: no religion shall either receive the 
state’s support or incur its hostility. Religion is outside the sphere of 
political government. . . . Much that is the concern of temporal 
authority affects the spiritual interests of men. But it is not enough to 
strike down a non-discriminatory law that it may hurt or offend some 
dissident view. . . . It is only in a theocratic state that ecclesiastical 
doctrines measure legal right or wrong.101 
 
For Frankfurter, the flag salute statutes were non-discriminatory laws. 
Taking religion into account is something that would only be done in a 
theocratic state. This can only be described as willful blindness to the 
history and purpose of the adoption of the mandatory flag salute 
measures. They were most certainly not non-discriminatory laws; 
rather they were specifically targeted at a particular religious minority, 
in an effort to extract conformity from them. 
 
 99. According to Feldman, 
Although he sensed it only incompletely, Frankfurter was facing the most important 
crossroads of his judicial career. For more than a quarter of a century, while 
conservatives controlled the Supreme Court, Frankfurter had argued that judges must 
allow democratic majorities to act as they pleased, even when their decisions were 
fundamentally flawed. Now liberals had a majority on the Supreme Court—and they 
were arguing that the Court should intervene to protect the rights of minorities. 
Frankfurter realized that if he remained a stalwart of judicial restraint, he would be 
condemned by the liberals whom he had hoped to lead. But having made a career 
arguing against judicial interference in the majority’s decisions, Frankfurter chose to 
stick to his guns. 
FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 231–32. The irony was that as a result of his principled consistency, 
Frankfurter was transformed from a liberal into a conservative. 
Frankfurter’s critics, then and later, have tried to explain how it could be that the 
country’s best-known liberal became its leading judicial conservative. But the source 
of the change was not Frankfurter, whose constitutional philosophy remained 
remarkably consistent throughout his career. It was the rest of liberalism that 
abandoned him and moved on once judicial restraint was no longer a useful tool to 
advance liberal objectives. 
Id. at 232. 
 100. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 648, quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 231. 
 101. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 653–54, quoted in MANWARING, supra note 8, at 233. 
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In all, it took the Jehovah’s Witnesses six trips to the Supreme 
Court to secure the conscientious right to be free from coercion with 
respect to the Pledge of Allegiance.102 
 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEANING OF BELONGING 
 
It is hard not to be struck by the resonance of these decisions for 
our current political moment, when strong forces promoting equality, 
unity, and uniformity are aligned against powerful claims of 
conscience. What we might call the Frankfurter/Gobitis conception of 
unity is based upon trusting the state and its political institutions to 
inculcate, and if required, to impose the necessary values upon the 
citizenry that will generate national unity and its corollary, security. 
Under this vision, general and neutral laws (or those that can be so 
construed) that treat everyone equally have a strong presumption in 
their favor. Equality trumps freedom. The Jackson/Barnette 
conception, in contrast, is based upon a pluralism that is far more 
tolerant of dissent and difference. Conscience is protected and 
vindicated, except when the most pressing state interests are 
jeopardized. 
 
A.  Belonging in Gobitis 
 
1.  Justice Frankfurter’s view 
 
Implicit in Frankfurter’s opinion is a very clear picture of, to use 
Professor Robert Burt’s phrase, belonging to America.103 The image 
of belonging “to” is more powerful than the image of belonging “in” 
because there is a sense of ownership and inclusion that is richer than 
merely being present in or a part of the group. 
In Frankfurter’s view of belonging, significant trust is placed in 
political institutions, and there is considerable deference to their 
“authority to safeguard the nation’s fellowship.”104 Courts are to 
exercise considerable restraint and must not substitute their policy 
judgments for those of the majoritarian institutions. Frankfurter 
 
 102. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 249. 
 103. Robert A. Burt, Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University, Address at 
the Brigham Young University Symposium on Belonging: Belonging in America: How to 
Understand Same-Sex Marriage (Jan. 28, 2011) (Professor Burt’s address was presented by Steve 
Averett, Brigham Young University faculty member). 
 104. This is the phrase Frankfurter uses in the first paragraph of his Gobitis opinion, where 
he contrasts this authority with liberty, including the “liberty of conscience.” 310 U.S. at 591. 
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conceives of the claims of conscience being individual—the “pursuit of 
one’s convictions about the ultimate mystery of the universe”105 or 
“his conception of religious duty”106—whereas the interests on the 
other side are viewed as being communal—the “felt necessities of 
society”107 or “the secular interests of his fellow men.”108 Not 
surprisingly, so conceptualized, the generalized interests of the many 
outweigh the quixotic interests of the individual. 
At the heart of Frankfurter’s view of belonging is “national 
cohesion,” which requiring participation in the flag salute is designed 
to promote.109 According to Frankfurter, “We are dealing with an 
interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values. National 
unity is the basis of national security.”110 Thus, belonging rests upon 
unity, and unity is fostered when everyone is treated equally and is 
subject to the same requirement to salute the flag. 
The significance of the flag is that it is the very symbol of our 
national unity. Quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Frankfurter 
declares, “We live by symbols” and the “flag is the symbol of our 
national unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, 
within the framework of the Constitution.”111 Frankfurter asserts that 
the flag is “the emblem of freedom in its truest, best sense,” 
signifying “government resting on the consent of the governed,” 
representing “liberty regulated by law,” as well as “the protection of 
the weak against the strong,” and “security against the exercise of 
arbitrary power.”112 No doubt, this expression was felt as bitterly 
ironic by the Gobitises and other dissenters. Frankfurter reassures 
them that forcing them to comply with the directive to salute the flag 
vindicates “liberty regulated by law” and the “protection of the weak 
against the strong,” but nothing could be further from the truth. 
Frankfurter’s assertions are so directly contrary to the basic 
implications of his holding that his rhetoric stands as a solemn 
reminder of how deeply contrary to our stated intentions our actions 
may be. 
 
 
 105. Id. at 593. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 595. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 596 (quoting Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 43 (1907)). 
 112. Id. 
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2.  Justice Stone’s view 
 
The view of belonging implicit in Justice Stone’s dissent is based 
upon pluralism and respect for conscientious difference. Justice Stone 
does not disagree that national unity is an important value, but he does 
disagree that compelled affirmations in conflict with conscience are an 
appropriate means of achieving unity. 
 
[W]hile such expressions of loyalty, when voluntarily given, may 
promote national unity, it is quite another matter to say that their 
compulsory expression by children in violation of their own and their 
parents’ religious convictions can be regarded as playing so 
important a part in our national unity as to leave school boards free 
to exact it despite the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
religion.113 
 
While voluntary participation in patriotic exercises may promote 
national unity, compelling them is not permitted under the 
Constitution. 
 
B.  Belonging in Barnette 
 
1.  Justice Jackson’s view 
 
The conception of belonging implicit in the Jackson/Barnette 
approach to the flag salute issue is based upon pluralism and respect 
for difference, and it builds upon and expands the view expressed by 
Justice Stone’s dissent in Gobitis. Unity is the byproduct of a 
constitutional system that respects conscience and demands conformity 
only when genuinely necessary. 
 
2.  Justice Frankfurter’s dissent 
 
If anything, Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Barnette offers an even 
more strident and illiberal conception of belonging than his majority 
opinion in Gobitis. In Barnette he speaks as a minority of one in 
defense of an approach that has been rejected by a majority of the 
Court. Even the Justices Reed and Roberts, who did not reverse their 
position in Gobitis, were unwilling to join Frankfurter’s approach in 
Barnette. 
 
 113. Id. at 605. 
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According to Frankfurter, the only question in the case is whether 
“legislators could in reason have enacted such a law.”114 In answering 
this question, Frankfurter declares 
 
I cannot bring my mind to believe that the “liberty” secured by the 
Due Process Clause gives this Court authority to deny the State of 
West Virginia the attainment of that which we all recognize as a 
legitimate legislative end, namely, the promotion of good citizenship, 
by employment of the means here chosen.115 
 
Because the state of West Virginia has not acted completely without 
reason, Frankfurter says, the Court must not interfere with its 
judgments.116 Frankfurter then goes on to lecture the Court for more 
than twenty pages on the virtues of judicial restraint.117 Frankfurter 
again insists that the case involves “a general non-discriminatory civil 
regulation” that “touches conscientious scruples or religious beliefs of 
an individual or group.”118 
Frankfurter then invokes Jefferson for the principle that religious 
freedom really means nothing more than equal treatment: 
 
So far as the state was concerned, there was to be neither orthodoxy 
nor heterodoxy. And so Jefferson and those who followed him wrote 
guaranties of religious freedom into our constitutions. Religious 
minorities as well as religious majorities were to be equal in the eyes 
of the political state. But Jefferson and the others also knew that 
minorities may disrupt society. It never would have occurred to them 
to write into the Constitution the subordination of the general civil 
authority of the state to sectarian scruples.119 
 
The conception of belonging implicit here is purportedly one based 
upon equal treatment. Frankfurter is quite blind to the fact that the 
 
 114. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 647–71. For example, Justice Frankfurter quotes Justice Holmes for the 
proposition that, “It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties 
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.” Id. at 649 (quoting Mo. Kan. 
Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)). According to Frankfurter, Holmes was stating 
“that responsibility for legislation lies with legislatures, answerable as they are directly to the 
people, and this Court’s only and very narrow function is to determine whether within the broad 
grant of authority vested in legislature they have exercised a judgment for which reasonable 
justification can be offered.” Id. 
 118. Id. at 651. 
 119. Id. at 653. 
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West Virginia state school board, like the Minersville, Pennsylvania 
school board before it, was dictating what is orthodox. To 
Frankfurter, because the school board was not imposing an explicitly 
religious orthodoxy, its actions are subject only to very minimal 
review, even though its actions were directly targeted at suppressing 
religious dissent. 
Religious freedom is transformed by Frankfurter into an equality 
norm. Frankfurter insists he is vindicating “religious equality, not 
civil immunity.”120 For Frankfurter, the essence of religious freedom 
is “freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from 
conformity to law because of religious dogma.”121 Otherwise, 
Frankfurter warns, the specter is raised of every man becoming a law 
unto himself: “[E]ach individual could set up his own censor against 
obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the public good by those 
whose business it is to make laws.”122 The logic of this viewpoint is 
that general and neutral laws must be enforced equally against 
everyone, or else each person would simply decide for themselves 
which law to obey. 
This, of course, is a straw man argument. Even the most ardent 
defender of religious freedom does not propose that every person’s 
conscience gives them an absolute veto over the law. The serious 
question is what the appropriate basis will be for granting or denying a 
requested exemption—what is the appropriate standard for imposing a 
limitation upon religious freedom? Perhaps it will be a compelling 
state interest, or, as Justice Jackson puts it in Barnette, perhaps 
limitations on religious freedom are permissible “only to prevent grave 
and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully 
protect.”123 
But for Frankfurter, belonging rests upon equality, even if that 
equality requires coerced unanimity. The legislation in question, 
Frankfurter concedes, may be illiberal, but “the liberal spirit” cannot 
be “enforced by judicial invalidation of illiberal legislation. . . . Only 
a persistent positive translation of the faith of a free society into the 
convictions and habits and actions of a community is the ultimate 
reliance against unabated temptations to fetter the human spirit.”124 
Frankfurter is surely correct that at the end of the day a “free society” 
rests upon a community’s commitment to freedom; but for 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 639 (majority opinion). 
 124. Id. at 670–71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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Frankfurter, judicial restraint prevents the Court from invalidating 
legislation that is clearly contrary to that liberal spirit. 
 
C.  Implications for this Symposium’s Theme of Belonging 
 
It is interesting that in 1943, when feelings of national unity and 
resolve were high, respecting conscientious difference was not viewed 
as unduly threatening. Three years earlier, when the nation was deeply 
divided over whether or not to enter the war, compelling conformity 
was deemed necessary as a way of manufacturing unity. 
Under the Frankfurter/Gobitis view, uniformity, regularity, 
consistency, and general and equal application of the laws to everyone 
is the recipe for national unity. The underlying picture of belonging is 
based upon empowering schools to counteract the disruptive teaching 
of parents who might have counterproductive influences on their 
children. Belonging in the United States is a result of having the right 
attitudes of patriotism and loyalty inculcated in schools, which are the 
primary incubators of these values. From the duty to teach civics and 
patriotism, the ability to require student participation in patriotic 
exercises such as the Pledge of Allegiance is viewed as being almost 
axiomatic. 
It is easy to see the connection between unity, the central concern 
at the heart of the flag salute cases, and belonging, the central theme 
of this symposium. One of the springboards for our discussion of 
belonging is the Japanese concept of amae, introduced to the West 
through the psychological work of Dr. Takeo Doi,125 and translated 
into the U.S. family law context by former Brigham Young University 
law professor Bruce Hafen, who was introduced to the concept by 
University of Tokyo professor Akira Morita, who has addressed this 
topic in this symposium.126 
As Hafen notes, the usual English translation of amae as 
“dependence” misses something significant, namely the element of 
trust.127 To the Western ear, dependence has negative connotations, 
and suggests a developmental stage that one should pass through or 
overcome on the road to autonomous adulthood. As Professor Akira 
 
 125. Hafen relied on two of Doi’s key works, which had been translated into English: 
TAKEO DOI, THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (John Bester, trans., 2002) and TAKEO DOI, THE 
ANATOMY OF SELF (Mark A. Harbison, trans., 2001). 
 126. Akira Morita, Amae and Belonging—An encounter of the Japanese Psyche and the 
Waning of Belonging in America, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 341 (2011) 
 127. BRUCE C. HAFEN & MARIE K. HAFEN, THE BELONGING HEART: THE ATONEMENT 
AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOD AND FAMILY 23–24 (1994). 
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Morita explained to Professor Hafen more than twenty years ago, the 
term “belonging” better captures the meaning of amae.128 
Amae is first manifest in a child’s “longing for his mother,” but 
this feeling is not properly described as amae until the baby is “old 
enough to realize his independence from his mother.”129 Thus, amae is 
contrasted with fear of separation. For Doi, and for Hafen and Morita 
interpreting Doi, amae is not a stage of development to be passed 
through, but an important permanent component of human well-being. 
On this view, the need to belong, to have relationships of mutual 
reliance and even dependence, is not simply a sign of immaturity or a 
stage of development, but a condition of healthy mature emotional 
flourishing.130 
Amae rests upon trust that others will be sensitive and responsive 
to meeting one’s needs.131 To my mind, the approach to belonging 
implicit in the Frankfurter/Gobitis approach to coercion and 
conscience is deeply at odds with the concept of amae. In contrast, the 
Jackson/Barnette approach to coercion and conscience has deep 
resonance with the concept of amae. Perhaps this is best illustrated in 
 
 128. Better yet, says Professor Morita, “is the German translation of amae, which is 
Freiheit in Geborgenheit, which when translated literally means “freedom through emotional 
security.” HAFEN & HAFEN, supra note 127, at 33–34. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Professor Morita explains this as follows: “In Western societies, childhood 
dependency on parents is considered a temporary state of human development, to be 
subsequently rejected or repressed. In contrast, amae survives in Japanese society without being 
rejected, and constitutes a moral emotional source of the Japanese values of mutual dependency 
and sense of belonging to a group.” Morita, supra note 126, at 344. Or as Hafen explained it: 
As freedom in the Western mind has come to mean personal liberation from political 
bondage, with its profound skepticism toward authority, the Western mind has been 
relatively closed to the values of amae. For example, Americans “have always looked 
down on the type of emotional dependence” inherent in amae. Moreover, their fear of 
oppression and their fierce commitment to self-reliance has made Americans innately 
cautious about trust or depending on others—attitudes that are prerequisite to 
amae. . . . As a result of these tendencies, Western skepticism has created serious 
barriers to relationships of belonging and loving interdependence—even to the point of 
defining freedom as the rejection of dependence on others, which may mean freedom 
as the rejection of amae. In other words, our Western sense of freedom seeks to avoid 
belonging. 
HAFEN & HAFEN, supra note 127, at 33–34. 
 131. Doi explains amae as follows: “Amae is a noun form of amaeru, an intransitive verb 
meaning ‘to depend and presume upon another’s love or bask in another’s indulgence.’ It has the 
same root as the word amai, an adjective meaning ‘sweet.’ Thus amae can suggest something 
sweet and desirable.” Takeo Doi, On the Concept of Amae, in UNDERSTANDING AMAE 164 
(2005), quoted in Morita, supra note 126, at 343–44. Or as Hafen puts it, “The deepest 
psychological and emotional needs of children require continuity and stability in their relationship 
with parents—a relationship that can be the key factor in their eventual development of mature, 
personal freedom.” Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning 
of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 33, quoted in Morita, supra note 126, at 346. 
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the reactions of the two Gobitis children’s teachers. William Gobitis’s 
teacher responded to his refusal to salute the flag by physically trying 
to force him to raise his arm, and he responded by clinging to his 
pocket. His sister Lillian’s teacher, in contrast, responded by giving 
her a hug and calling her a “dear girl.” For a brief moment, this 
response reflected an attitude of amae (trusting belonging and reliance) 
in the teacher-student relationship. 
As Professor Morita has explained in this symposium, Doi 
understood that, “to become an adult is to control the ambivalence that 
arises between autonomy and dependence so that they complement 
each other, not to become an individual who achieves freedom and 
independence by emotionally cutting himself off from others.”132 To a 
significant extent, we may be able to answer questions about claims of 
conscience by asking what effect respecting or refusing to honor those 
claims contributes to a stable sense of belonging, both for those who 
exercise their conscience in contravention of group norms and 
expectations and for the group. Focusing on the relationships 
involved, Hafen suggests, helps us avoid the mistake of “abandoning 
children to their rights.”133 We can imagine, and in Gobitis we have 
observed, different modes of responding to requests for 
accommodating conscientious objection to saluting the flag—one that 
creates distance and distrust, and one that creates a sense of safety and 
belonging, both for the dissenter and those who are respecting the 
dissent. 
This deep concern for relationships has been a consistent theme in 
the presentations in this symposium, including Professor Helen M. 
Alvaré’s recommendations of ways to promote stable and dignified 
homes for disabled persons and their families. The homes Alvaré 
speaks of are places where we prepare people—and not just the 
disabled—for lives of interdependence, and not just independence.134 
 
 132. Morita, supra note 126, at 344–45. 
 133. Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations 
about Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”, 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 644 (1976) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Hafen, Individualism and Autnonomy, supra note 131, at 68–
72, available at http://lds.org/ensign/1989/ 10/the-waning-of-belonging (last visited Feb. 21, 
2011), quoted in Morita, supra note 126, at 345. 
 134. Helen M. Alvaré, Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of 
Law, Address at the Brigham Young University Symposium on Belonging: Belonging in 
America: Personhood Theory and the Value of Home for Disabled Persons and their Families 
(January 28, 2011). Alvaré noted that in today’s world we should be focused not simply on 
preparing people for lives of independence, but for lives of interdependence. Alvaré also 
contrasted Robert Frost’s line that “home is the place where, when you have to go there, they 
have to take you in”—with respect to the disabled, the law has turned this idea on its head, and 
families are the one place that can keep you out. Id. (quoting ROBERT FROST, The Death of the 
Hired Man, in POEMS BY ROBERT FROST: A BOY’S WILL AND NORTH OF BOSTON 69, 73 
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Alvaré is deeply sensitive not only to the need to avoid infantilizing 
the disabled, but also to the importance of not imagining that our goal 
will always be to prepare them for a life of maximum independence. 
A deep concern for relationships is also evident in Professor Ann 
Laquer Estin’s paper on different modes of determining where 
children “belong” when their families exist across national 
boundaries.135 Her framework for thinking about various mechanisms 
for determining belonging is helpful—belonging can be thought of in 
formalistic terms, subjectively as a matter of identity and affiliation, 
or on the basis of being present in a place.136 To my mind, 
Frankfurter’s approach in Gobitis reflects a more formalistic 
understanding of belonging based upon uniformity, upon forced 
participation in the flag salute, whereas the majority’s approach to 
belonging in Barnette takes into account subjective affiliations and the 
significance of particular children being physically present in 
particular classrooms. 
These issues take on additional complicating dimensions in light of 
ever-changing reproductive technologies and the increase in the 
number and configurations of non-traditional families, including same-
sex parent families. Professor Linda Elrod’s paper helps identify the 
myriad issues that arise just with respect to identifying who a child’s 
parents are. Her powerful argument for emphasizing the importance of 
looking at these issues from the perspectives of the affected children, 
not just their parents, is especially moving.137 One thing that is 
striking about the Court’s opinion in Gobitis is the absence of a 
concern for how the issue is viewed by the Gobitis children, and what 
the effect of the Court’s compulsion will be for them. 
Professor Margaret F. Brinig goes beyond theorizing about the 
significance of trust in her careful empirical examination of the 
likelihood of divorce for those who are raised in neighborhoods 
 
(2001)). Elsewhere, in a different context, I have contrasted models of church-state relations that 
emphasize independence, interdependence, and a unique model of interdependence that I describe 
and advocate. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 
1217 (2004). 
 135. Ann Laquer Estin, Where (in the World) do Children Belong?, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 
217 (2011). Professor Alvaré contrasts “formal” mechanisms that focus on citizenship and 
immigration status, “subjective” mechanisms that rest on indicators of identity and affiliation 
such as culture, language and heritage, and conceptions based upon a child’s “presence in a 
place.” Alvaré, supra note 134. Estin argues, “Children in the global village rarely belong to 
just one place, and in general, the broadest conception of where children belong helps to assure 
that governments will act to protect their welfare.” Estin, supra note 135, at 217. 
 136. Estin, supra note 135, at 217. 
 137. Linda Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for Intended 
Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245 (2011). 
392 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 25 
 
“where trust decreases and there is less social cohesion and more 
disorder.”138 Professor Brinig marshals convincing evidence that trust 
is connected with one’s sense of belonging on multiple levels—higher 
divorce rates later in life are correlated not just to the trust between 
one’s own parents, but also to more “generalized trust” that your 
neighborhood will “be there for you.”139 For example, her findings 
indicate that a fourteen-year-old who lives in a neighborhood with a 
high divorce rate is more likely to cohabit rather than marry, and that 
individual’s own marriages are more likely to end in divorce.140 
 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILIES AND RECOGNITION 
 
A.  Families in Gobitis 
 
1.  Justice Frankfurter’s opinion 
 
Justice Frankfurter argued in the Gobitis majority that it was good 
for families for children to be compelled to participate in patriotic 
observances such as the flag salute. As Frankfurter saw it, “The 
preciousness of the family relation, the authority and independence 
which give dignity to parenthood, indeed the enjoyment of all 
freedom, presuppose the kind of ordered society which is summarized 
by our flag.”141 
For Frankfurter, families are empowered when the state creates 
unity and order. Families are seen as benefitting from the strong arm 
of the state. For Frankfurter, parents are seen as being in competition 
with the state over the hearts and minds of their children, and the state 
is viewed as being at a comparative disadvantage to parents, which 
justifies compulsion at school: 
 
What the school authorities are really asserting is the right to awaken 
in the child’s mind considerations as to the significance of the flag 
contrary to those implanted by the parent. In such an attempt the 
state is normally at a disadvantage in competing with the parent’s 
authority, so long—and this is the vital aspect of religious 
toleration—as parents are unmolested in their right to counteract by 
their own persuasiveness the wisdom and rightness of those loyalties 
 
 138. Margaret F. Brinig, Belonging and Trust: Divorce and Social Capital, 25 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 271, 276 (2011). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 275. 
 141. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940), quoted in MANWARING, 
supra note 8, at 216. 
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which the state’s educational system is seeking to promote.142 
 
If you rushed through this long quotation, please go back and read 
it again. This is quite an extraordinary articulation of a vision of 
schools being in competition with parents, who “implant” unwanted 
ideas in the minds of their children and have an advantage over the 
state educational system because the state’s commitment to religious 
toleration leaves those parents unmolested in their efforts to 
indoctrinate their children. Faced with parents so empowered, what 
school authorities seek, in Frankfurter’s mind, is simply the right to 
awaken children’s minds to values such as patriotism. 
 
2.  Justice Stone’s dissent 
 
Justice Stone’s dissent in Gobitis offers an interesting 
counterpoint. He, too, notes that the state may be in competition with 
parents when it comes to the education of children, but Stone observes 
that the state “may through teaching in the public schools indoctrinate 
the minds of the young” and force them “to make affirmation[s] 
contrary to [their] belief[s] and in violation of [their] religious 
faith.”143 In Stone’s estimation, conceding this kind of power to the 
state was “a long step, and one which I am unable to take.”144 Stone 
further explained: 
 
The very fact that we have constitutional guaranties of civil liberties 
and the specificity of their command where freedom of speech and 
of religion are concerned require some accommodation of the powers 
which government normally exercises, when no question of civil 
liberty is involved, to the constitutional demand that those liberties 
be protected against the action of government itself.145 
 
Faced with a government empowered to require that children 
violate their basic religious tenets in the name of national unity, Stone 
concluded that the Constitutional protections for religious freedom 
outweighed any “inconveniences which may attend some sensible 
adjustment of school discipline in order that the religious convictions 
of these children may be spared.”146 
 
 142. 310 U.S. at 599. 
 143. Id. at 602. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 602–03. 
 146. Id. at 607. 
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B.  Families in Barnette 
 
The Jackson/Barnette view sees families and their role quite 
differently. Parents, rather than the state, are viewed as having the 
primary role in inculcating values, and the state’s views on what is 
good for children do not necessarily trump parents’ view of what they 
believe to be good for their children. 
 
C.  Implications for this Symposium’s Theme of Families and 
Recognition 
 
The significance of families to one’s sense of belonging can hardly 
be exaggerated, and has been an important theme in this symposium. 
The theme of being and becoming in Dr. Ya’ir Ronen’s paper147 
resonates with the conflicts at the heart of the flag salute cases, which 
involved young children in the process of both being and becoming, 
subject to strong competing influences from family and the state. In 
the flag salute cases, the child’s sense of belonging—at school, in their 
families, in their religious communities, as American citizens—exists 
mostly as a misty background consideration. In the background of the 
flag salute controversies lie very different attitudes towards the 
“being” of the children, and what the best way is to facilitate helping 
them “become” authentic human beings, true to themselves.148 
The Court’s focus on rights leaves little room for an in-depth 
consideration of the implications of the Court’s choices, not to 
mention those of school boards, superintendents, principals, teachers, 
and peers, for the children’s relationships. Professor Hafen’s concern 
that our approach to these issues “abandons children to their rights” 
seems to be a legitimate worry.149 Courts are programmed to think it 
terms of rights, but this can result in a sort of myopia that leaves 
unaddressed the implications of vindicating or failing to vindicate a 
right for important relationships. 
Professor Laurence C. Nolan’s paper on the implications of aging 
for belonging150 might seem further removed from the issues in 
Gobitis. But consider her articulation of the need that all human 
 
 147. Ya’ir Ronen, On the Child’s Need to Be One’s Self, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 233 (2011). 
 148. As Dr. Ronen puts it, “Alongside the child’s need ‘to become,’ to develop and 
change, to fulfill dreams and plans . . . there is another need. This is the child’s need to be his 
or her authentic self, and . . . to be recognized as ‘somebody’ when simply being that self.” Id. 
at 234–35. 
 149. Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 133. 
 150. Laurence C. Nolan, Dimensions of Aging and Belonging for the Older Person and the 
Effects of Ageism, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 317 (2011). 
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beings—the old and young especially—have to belong:  
 
[T]o belong, that is, in the sense that you are not alone, but part of 
the group. You are not isolated from others. You matter to others 
rather than only to yourself. Others do not perceive you as an 
outsider. You feel connected to others including as a citizen to your 
state and country.151  
 
This quote, I think, could have been written as an indictment of the 
majority approach in Gobitis. It does not take a large dose of moral 
imagination to understand that the Gobitis children were made to feel 
they did not belong, that they were made to feel isolated, that they did 
not matter to others, and that they were not valued as citizens.152 
Professor Nolan helps highlight the truth that belonging is especially 
important when we are most vulnerable—including when we are very 
young and when we are very old.153 
Professor Scott FitzGibbon invites us to think about belonging as 
it relates to legal recognition. Legal recognition, he argues, involves 
characterization and accreditation of a person as a legitimate member 
of a group.154 
Professor Lynn Wardle tackles a particularly difficult dimension of 
the issue of belonging—the need to exclude. Belonging does not exist 
without boundaries; inclusion of some implies exclusion of others. As 
Wardle notes, “One of the paradoxes of belonging is that the need to 
belong also creates a need to exclude; in order for belonging to occur, 
there must be boundaries, standards defining the relationship, and 
criteria that separate . . . . All communities have membership 
requirements.”155 In the flag salute cases, the voices for coercion and 
conscience both seek to vindicate the value of belonging. For 
Frankfurter belonging is based upon unity and mutuality, and for 
Jackson belonging is consistent with accommodating conscientious 
 
 151. Id. at 317. 
 152. This sentiment is easily discerned, for example, in the handwritten note that young 
William Gobitis gave to his school’s directors. In his note William struggled to assert his 
belonging as a citizen without betraying his religious beliefs. He wrote, “I do not salute the flag 
not because I do not love my country but I love my country and I love God more and I must 
obey His commandments.” Letter from William Gobitis to the Minersville, Pennsylvania School 
Directors (Nov. 5, 1935) available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mcc& 
fileName=016/page.db&recNum=1&itemLink=r?ammem/mcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(mcc/016). 
 153. Professor Nolan notes that the elderly often have a very weak sense of belonging, and 
that these feelings are often an indicator of depression. Nolan, supra note 150, at 321. 
 154. Scott FitzGibbon, Parent, Child, Husband, Wife: When Recognition Fails, Tragedy 
Ensues, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 203, 207–08 (2011). 
 155. Lynn D. Wardle, The Boundaries of Belonging: Allegiance and the Definition of 
Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 289 (2011). 
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difference. Both approaches have implications of exclusion as well as 
inclusion. The Gobitis approach had the effect of excluding the Gobitis 
children from the public schools because they refused to bow to the 
state—they were willing to pay the price of expulsion to defend their 
conscience. Although less obvious, Barnette, too, has implications for 
exclusion. When freedom is vindicated, equality suffers. However, 
instead of the community excluding the individual, in Barnette the 
individual is standing aside from the community. The unity of shared 
patriotic exercises is weakened when individual conscience is 
respected as a legitimate basis for not participating in general and 
universal exercises like the Pledge of Allegiance. Dissenting 
individuals exclude themselves from the shared patriotic observance, 
which undermines the equality and unity that exists when everyone 
participates. 
 
 VII.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSCIENCE AND CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTION  
 
This brings us to the third and final primary theme of this 
symposium—conscience and conscientious objection. Conscience is 
afforded nearly sacred status under the Jackson/Barnette formulation, 
whereas conscience is afforded far less weight in the 
Frankfurter/Gobitis view of our constitutional order. 
 
A.  Conscience in Gobitis 
 
1.  Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion 
 
As Frankfurter originally framed the issue in the first paragraph of 
his opinion in Gobitis, the Court is called upon to “reconcile the 
conflicting claims of liberty and authority.”156 This might appear to be 
a balanced characterization of the conflict, but over the course of his 
opinion Frankfurter squarely sides against “liberty of conscience” and 
on the side of authority, as he puts it, “to safeguard the nation’s 
fellowship.”157 
The way Frankfurter frames and reframes the issue throughout his 
opinion is a telling and useful illustration of how the ways in which 
we characterize values in conflict can lead us inexorably to one 
outcome rather than another. With each iteration of the issue—and 
 
 156. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591 (1940). 
 157. Id. 
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there are many of them—it is as if the “individual’s” liberty interest is 
further diminished and “society’s” collective interest in unity and 
cohesion is amplified. Or to use another metaphor, with each iteration 
of the issue, it is as if Frankfurter adds further rhetorical weight to 
one side of the scales of justice, while repeatedly removing weight 
from the other side, until at the end of the day, one side slams down 
decisively. 
Early in the opinion, “conscience of individuals” is seen as 
“collid[ing] with the felt necessities of society.”158 A little later, a 
man’s “conception of religious duty” is seen as being in “conflict with 
the secular interests of his fellow men.”159 Later still, “religious 
liberty” is juxtaposed with “legislation of general scope not directed 
against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects.”160 Frankfurter then 
characterizes the issue as pitting “conscientious scruples” against 
“obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction 
of religious beliefs.”161 Later “those who refuse[] obedience from 
religious conviction” are weighed against “manifestations of specific 
powers of government deemed by the legislature essential to secure 
and maintain that orderly, tranquil, and free society without which 
religious toleration itself is unattainable.”162 Eventually, the societal 
interest is characterized as the “promotion of national cohesion.”163 
Frankfurter deems this to be “an interest inferior to none in the 
hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the basis of national 
security.”164 The flag, Frankfurter maintains, “is the symbol of our 
national unity, transcending all internal differences, however large.”165 
 
 158. Id. at 593. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 594. This is a highly contestable characterization of the regulations at issue, 
which were explicitly targeted at dissenting Jehovah’s Witnesses. The claim that the school board 
resolution in Gobitis was “legislation of general scope” and that it was “not directed against 
doctrinal loyalties of particular sects” is not just dubious, but flatly contradicted by the record. 
See MANWARING, supra note 8, at 82–83. 
 161. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594. 
 162. Never mind that the regulations requiring participation in the flag salute were not laws 
enacted by the Pennsylvania state legislature, but resolutions passed by a local school board, 
which Frankfurter imbues with the same status and authority as the legislature. Id. at 595. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 596. Frankfurter goes on to cite the Court’s opinion in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 
U.S. 34 (1907):  
The flag is the symbol of the nation’s power, the emblem of freedom in its truest, 
best sense . . . it signifies government resting on the consent of the governed; liberty 
regulated by law; the protection of the weak against the strong; security against the 
exercise of arbitrary power; and absolute safety for free institutions against foreign 
aggression. 
Id. at 43. Frankfurter does not address the irony of maintaining that compelling pledging 
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By the end of the opinion, not only are these interests second to none, 
but Frankfurter claims that to hold otherwise would be to turn the 
Supreme Court into the “school board for the country” that might 
express a policy preference for “giving unfettered scope to the most 
crotchety beliefs” and respecting “individual idiosyncrasies.”166 
With this, Frankfurter’s rhetorical tour de force of aggrandizing 
the state’s interest in compelling conformity—national security, an 
interest inferior to none in the legal hierarchy—reaches a crescendo, 
while the competing liberty interests are ultimately dismissed (and 
dismissible) as “crotchety beliefs” and “individual idiosyncrasies.” It 
is little wonder that the drum beat of national unity, cohesion, and 
security drowns out the soft flutes of individual freedom of 
“dissidents” who seek “exceptional immunity.”167 
Under the Frankfurter/Gobitis view, conscience must yield to 
general secular regulations that are not specifically targeted at religion. 
As the flurry of enactments requiring participation in patriotic 
exercises after Gobitis illustrates, sometimes such “secular 
regulations” are thinly veiled (or even explicit) attempts to coerce 
religious conformity. It is very similar to the view articulated by 
Justice Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court held 
that laws that burden religious exercise do not violate the Free 
Exercise if they are general and neutral.168 So closely related are these 
viewpoints that Justice Scalia actually quotes Gobitis in his Smith 
opinion, without acknowledging in the text that Gobitis was explicitly 
overturned by Barnette.169 
 
2.  Justice Stone’s dissent 
 
Justice Stone concedes that “constitutional guaranties of personal 
liberty are not always absolutes.”170 But in his view, religious 
 
allegiance to the flag is a way of “protecting the weak against the strong.” Id. 
 166. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598. 
 167. Id. at 599–600. 
 168. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 169. Justice Scalia quoted Justice Frankfurter: “Conscientious scruples have not, in the 
course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a 
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of 
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve 
the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.” Id. at 879 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
at 594–95). Scalia also cited Gobitis for the principle that, “The right of free exercise does not 
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).’” Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982)). 
 170. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 602 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
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practices may be suppressed only when they are “dangerous to 
morals, . . . [or] are inimical to public safety, health, and good 
order.”171 But from these permissible limitations, Stone says, “it is a 
long step, and one which I am unable to take, to the position that 
government may, as a supposed educational measure and as a means 
of disciplining the young, compel public affirmations which violate 
their religious conscience.”172 Stone begins to articulate a conception 
of secularity that is pluralistic. Religious practices may be suppressed, 
but only when they are “dangerous to morals,” or are “inimical to 
public safety, health, and good order.” In other words, limitations are 
permissible when they are necessary to vindicate a specific list of 
legitimating grounds for limitation.173 
 
B.  Conscience in Barnette 
 
As noted earlier, conscience is afforded very high status in Justice 
Jackson’s majority opinion in Barnette. Near the end of his opinion, 
Justice Jackson describes the price for accommodating differences of 
opinion on even important issues as one worth bearing. 
 
The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision 
are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, 
we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that 
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary 
will disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism 
will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and 
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an 
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free 
minds.174 
 
Patriotism is fully compatible with and enhanced by a commitment to 
pluralism. To think that patriotism will flourish under a regime of 
compulsion rather than one of voluntarism is to underestimate the 
appeal of freedom. 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. It is interesting to see how close this is to the way religious freedom claims are 
treated under the international human rights instruments that were drafted in the aftermath of 
World War II, with cases like Barnette very much on the minds of the drafters. See Brett G. 
Scharffs, Symposium Introduction: The Freedom of Religion and Belief Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Legal, Moral, Political and Religious Perspectives, 26 J.L. & 
RELIGION 249 (2010–11). 
 174. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943). 
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C.  Implications for This Symposium’s Theme of Conscience and 
Conscientious Objection 
 
The call for respecting conscience is addressed directly by 
Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson’s presentation at this conference 
about religious liberty exemptions with respect to same-sex marriage 
laws, and several articles she has written previously on the topic of 
conscious-based exemptions generally.175 Of course, dissenters with 
religious or moral objections to same-sex marriage could be forced to 
participate in facilitating same-sex marriages, as the children in 
Gobitis were forced to salute the flag. This does not seem to be a 
particularly attractive model for changing hearts and minds. If that 
were to happen, public officials who refuse to comply might be forced 
to resign or to face criminal penalties,176 photographers who dissent 
could be fined,177 and ministers or churches that dissent could be 
punished.178 Or, more attractively, exemptions for conscience could be 
given either judicially or through legislation.179 The lessons of the flag 
 
 175. See Robin Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee 
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2010); Robin Wilson, 
Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life after Prop 8, 14 CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 101 
(2009). 
 176. After the California Supreme Court invalidated California’s “one man and one 
woman” marriage laws in In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008), several religiously-
motivated County Clerks attempted a variety of pretexts to avoid sanctioning same-sex 
marriages. For example, three days before same-sex marriages were to start the Merced County 
Clerk, Stephen Jones, announced that he would no longer issue marriage licenses for any 
couples. By way of explanation, Jones claimed, “This wasn’t about my beliefs on the issue [of 
same-sex marriage],” and cited staffing and space shortages instead. Eventually Jones began 
performing marriages again when his explanation was discredited in the local newspaper. 
Corinne Reilly, Merced Clerk Backtracks On No Weddings, THE MODESTO BEE (Jun. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.modbee.com/2008/06/08/322199/merced-clerk-backtracks-on-no.html; 
see also Timothy Kincaid, Two More California Counties Stop Officiating at Weddings, BOX 
TURTLE BULLETIN (Jun. 11, 2008), http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/2008/06/11/2187. 
 177. A wedding photographer in New Mexico was found to have violated New Mexico law 
by refusing to photograph a same-sex wedding. Willock, LLC, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. 
Hum. Rts. Comm. Apr. 9, 2008) (decision and final order), available at http://volokh.com/files/ 
willockopinion.pdf. 
 178. For extensive discussion of attempts to strip religiously-affiliated organizations of tax-
exempt status over same-sex discrimination issues, see Douglas M. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage 
and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 
2008). 
 179. “One state, Connecticut, has exempted religious organizations that provide ‘adoption, 
foster care or social services,’ like Catholic Charities, from the duty to place children with same-
sex couples if the organization receives no public funds, while two states, Vermont and New 
Hampshire, have exempted fraternal benefit societies, like the Knights of Columbus, from 
extending benefits to same-sex spouses. A single state, New Hampshire, exempts individual 
objectors who work for a religious organization from the duty to solemnize, celebrate, or 
promote same-sex marriages if doing so would violate ‘religious beliefs and faith.’” Robin 
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salute cases resonate deeply with the call of Professor Wilson and 
others for recognizing claims of conscience with respect to same-sex 
marriage and adoption.180 
The contrasting approaches to issues of coercion and conscience 
evident in the flag salute cases are addressed in a deeply thoughtful 
way by Professor Robert Burt’s paper, Belonging in America.181 It is 
impossible to do justice to Professor Burt’s complex and subtle 
argument here, so I will focus on just one aspect. Burt contrasts two 
very different judicial voices with which the Supreme Court speaks to 
American citizens—one voice that is characterized by coercion, by 
“declaring a winner” and “order[ing] compliance by the loser,” while 
the other voice is “much more subtle in its effectuation” because it 
aims at changing hearts and minds and appeals to us to change our 
conceptions of ourselves.182 
The first voice is familiar enough, but the second voice is also 
evident in a number of contexts. It is exemplified in the move from 
Brown I,183 where the Supreme Court, utilizing the first voice, 
declared that separate is not equal,184 to Brown II,185 where the Court 
called for “all deliberate speed” in the process of integration.186 Here 
the Court shifted to the second voice. As Burt explains it: 
 
So far as the Court was concerned, the future began to arrive only a 
decade later, when the nationally elected officials in Congress and 
the Presidency overwhelming approved the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These laws were enacted over 
the continued opposition of the white segregationists in Congress and 
in most Southern statehouses. But these Southerners were by now 
morally isolated—not simply or even primarily because the black-
robed Nine Old Men in Washington had ruled against them, but 
because the national community now opposed them and embraced 
 
Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to 
Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318, 319–20 (2010) (quoting N.H. Rev. 
Stat. § 457:37). 
 180. See generally id. For a less formal discussion of exemptions, see this archived series 
of exchanges between Dale Carpenter, Doug Laycock, Robin Wilson, Carl Esbeck, Rick 
Garnett, and Tom Berg on Volokh.com. Dale Carpenter, Protecting Religious Liberty from Gay 
Marriage and Protecting Gay Marriage from Religious Liberty, VOLOKH.COM (Apr. 23, 2009, 
1:16AM), available at http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1240449003.shtml. 
 181. Robert A. Burt, Belonging in America: How to Understand Same-Sex Marriage, 25 
BYU J. PUB. L. 351 (2011). 
 182. Id. at 356–57. 
 183. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 184. Id. at 495. 
 185. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 186. Id. at 301. 
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the cause of African-Americans, who were increasingly vocal on 
their own behalf in both the North and South. The Court set the 
stage for this public activity by endorsing and giving high visibility 
to the grievances of African-Americans; but the Court did not and 
could not order the voluntary recognition extended to African-
Americans by nationally elected officials.187 
 
Burt suggests that this second model might be the right approach 
for dealing with the issue of gay marriage,188 and identifies a concrete 
tactic that the Court might employ to exercise what Alexander 
Bickel,189 speaking about the same series of school desegregation cases 
a generation earlier, described as the “passive virtues”190—defer the 
question to states and state law.191 
One advantage of the first approach, which Burt recognizes, is 
that it provides definite resolutions to specific disputes, but the second 
approach is more appropriate when what is sought is not just the 
“right to be left alone or even a right to be passively tolerated or 
actively forgiven in their sinful practices,” but when claimants are 
asserting instead “a right to be approved by, affirmatively embraced 
by, the community in which they claim fully honored membership.”192 
As Burt correctly observes, “This result cannot be imposed on the 
community from outside.”193 By its nature, this sort of claim must be 
“framed as a request rather than a coercive demand.”194 While judicial 
force can be utilized to “command attention,” it cannot be effectively 
 
 187. Burt, supra note 181, at 358. 
 188. Id. at 357. 
 189. Professor Burt is the Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law at Yale Law School. 
Alexander Bickel, who clerked for Justice Frankfurter during the 1952 term and was a professor 
at Yale Law School, is most well known for his long-running defense of judicial restraint. See 
generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed., Vail-Ballou Press 1986) (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); see also John Moeller, Alexander Bickel: Toward A Theory of 
Politics, 47 J. POL. 113 (1985). 
 190. BICKEL, supra note 189, at 200–01. Pay particular attention to the discussion of the 
phrase “all deliberate speed” on pages 246–254. 
 191. Burt identifies three virtues of deferring to state courts: first, because no single state 
court decision would apply to the whole United States, each state court could be a participant in 
the debate (and presumably add new ideas to the discussion); second, because state constitutions 
are much easier to amend than the federal Constitution, no state supreme court will have a final 
word on the matter; and finally, because repeated litigation in state courts would keep both sides 
of the same-sex marriage debate in regular contact with each other, there would be ample 
opportunity for them to learn to see each other “as recognizable human beings rather than moral 
abstractions or demonic forces.” Burt, supra note 181, at 360. 
 192. Burt, supra note 103. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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employed to “command obedience.”195 
The flag salute cases can be understood as another context where 
the Court saw the virtue of backing down from a “command and 
control” posture into an “intermediary-evocative” posture, framing 
ideals of respect and toleration in a way that was calculated to elicit a 
deeper patriotism than what could be coerced from people. Justice 
Jackson’s arguments about coercion could easily be transported to the 
issue of gay marriage: 
 
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife 
becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no 
deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation 
than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose 
program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in 
embracing.196 
 
Professor Burt’s approach to these issues could well be summed 
up by Justice Jackson’s final declaration: “If there is any fixed star in 
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein.”197 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
As Professor Thomas Berg has recently observed, religious and 
sexual minorities have more in common than either side seems to want 
to admit.198 Both make claims that go to the very heart of personal 
identity and self-understanding; both make claims with public as well 
as private dimensions; both are likely to remain minorities and may 
not fare well if left only to the vicissitudes of public opinion. And 
both want more than to be left alone or barely tolerated; each wants a 
measure of approval and affirmation; they want to feel safe; they want 
to belong. 
Conversations such as those we have had in this symposium will 
hopefully be instrumental in finding ways forward, not just to finding 
ways of seeing these goals as not being mutually irreconcilable, but in 
finding ways to vindicate—if imperfectly—both. 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
 197. Id. at 642. 
 198. Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Claims Have in 
Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010). 
